Preliminary Draft: January 13, 2010. Forthcoming, SUPREME COURT REVIEW.
Please do not quote without permission

Legal Studies Paper No. 2009-23
SUPREME COURT REVIEW (FORTHCOMING)

“CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AND ANTIAVOIDANCE
BY THE ROBERTS COURT”

Professor Richard L. Hasen

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436669
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436669

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE
BY THE ROBERTS COURT
RICHARD L. HASEN*
INTRODUCTION
At the (apparent but not real) end of the October 2008 Supreme Court
term, the Court took diametrically opposing positions in a pair of sensitive
election law cases. In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v Holder
(NAMUDNO),1 the Court avoided deciding a thorny question about the
constitutionality of a provision of the Voting Rights Act. The Court did so
through a questionable application of the doctrine of “constitutional avoidance.”
That doctrine (also known as the “avoidance canon”) encourages a court to adopt
one of several plausible interpretations of a statute in order to avoid deciding a
tough constitutional question.2 In NAMUDNO, however, the Court—without
objection from single Justice—embraced a manifestly implausible statutory
interpretation to avoid the constitutional question.3
A week after NAMUDNO issued, the Court announced it would not be
deciding a campaign finance case, Citizens United v Federal Election
Commission,4 by the Court’s summer break as scheduled. Instead, the Court set
the case for reargument in September (before the start of the new Court term),
expressly asking the parties to brief the question whether the Court should
overturn two of its precedents upholding the constitutionality of corporate
spending limits in candidate elections.5 The constitutional issue had been
abandoned by the law’s challengers in the court below and was not even

*

William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks
to Neal Devins, Ned Foley, Beth Garrett, Hal Krent, Nate Persily, Rick Pildes, and Mark Tushnet
for useful comments and suggestions. This article went to press before the Court issued its opinion
in the Citizens United case.
1
129 S Ct 2504 (2009).
2
See Part I.A (describing doctrine).
3
See Part II.A.
4
129 S Ct 2893 (2009).
5
Id. (“This case is restored to the calendar for reargument. The parties are directed to file
supplemental briefs addressing the following question: For the proper disposition of this case,
should the Court overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990), and the part of McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which
addresses the facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2
U.S.C. §441b?”).
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mentioned in the challengers’ jurisdictional statement.6 Moreover, the
constitutional question could easily be avoided through a plausible interpretation
of the applicable campaign finance statute. Thus, in Citizens United, the Court
gave itself an opportunity to apply a little-noticed (and rarely used) tool of antiavoidance: the Court will eschew a plausible statutory interpretation in order
decide a difficult constitutional question.7 It remains to be seen whether the Court
will actually decide the constitutional question when it issues its decision. But
the reargument order itself was a use of the anti-avoidance tool: the Court went
out of its way to make a thorny constitutional question more prominent by
scheduling briefing and argument on it despite a plausible statutory escape hatch.
In both cases the Court failed to follow the usual understanding of the
avoidance canon: in NAMUDNO, the Court applied the canon to adopt an
implausible reading of a statute that appeared contrary to textual analysis,
congressional intent, and administrative interpretation. In Citizens United, the
Court failed to dispose of the case initially through a plausible reading of a
statute, setting itself up to address a constitutional question head-on that was not
properly presented to the Court. What explains the divergent approaches in the
two cases, and what does the divergence tell us about the Roberts Court? In this
Article, I describe the divergent approaches the Court took in these cases in detail
and identify the evidence supporting three competing explanations for the Court’s
actions, ranging from the most charitable to least charitable reading of the Court’s
motives.
First, the fruitful dialogue explanation posits that the Court will use
constitutional avoidance only when doing so would further a dialogue with
Congress that has a realistic chance of actually avoiding constitutional problems
through redrafting. On this reading, the Voting Rights Act got “remanded” to
Congress because Congress may fix it in ways that do not violate the
Constitution, but the corporate spending limits provision of federal campaign
finance law perhaps does not deserve remand because the campaign finance laws
are not constitutionally fixable.
Second, the political legitimacy explanation posits that the Court uses the
constitutional avoidance doctrine when it fears that a full-blown constitutional
pronouncement would harm its legitimacy. Some evidence supports this
understanding. In the same term that the Court avoided the constitutional
question in NAMUDNO, it used the same avoidance canon to narrowly construe a
6

See Part II.B.
The discovery of the anti-avoidance tool lends some credence to Llewellyn’s complaint that
every canon of construction has a contrary “counter-canon.” Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to Be Construed, 3
Vand L Rev (1950).
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different provision of the Voting Rights Act in Bartlett v Strickland,8 and it
applied constitutional avoidance (in deed if not in name) to narrowly construe
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Ricci v DeStefano,9 the controversial
New Haven firefighters case. Each of these cases involved tough questions of
race relations whose resolution could harm the Court’s legitimacy. In contrast,
campaign finance issues are much lower salience to the public, and are less likely
to arouse the passion of interest groups and perhaps the ire of Congress.
Third, the political calculus explanation posits that the Court uses
constitutional avoidance to soften public and Congressional resistance to the
Court’s movement of the law in a direction that the Court prefers as a matter of
policy. Under this positive political theory explanation of the Court’s actions, the
difference between NAMUDNO and Citizens United is simply one of timing, and
the cases are not so different after all. The Court had already laid the groundwork
for a deregulatory campaign finance regime through its earlier campaign finance
rulings: it may now be ready to put a stake in the heart of the corporate spending
limits. Under that reading, the Voting Rights Act’s time of demise will come, and
the public will come to expect it once the Court first raised constitutional doubts
in NAMUDNO. The avoidance canon is just another doctrinal tool in the Court’s
arsenal to move constitutional law and policy in the Court’s direction and at the
Court’s chosen speed. Like the political legitimacy argument, the political
calculus argument is one about the Court’s legitimacy, but it is one that views the
Court as strategic in pursuing an agenda rather than as fearful.
While it is impossible to know which of these explanations is correct (and
more than one may be in play for at least some of the Justices), the developments
of the October 2008 term suggest that the constitutional avoidance doctrine offers
broad clues about the Roberts Court and its willingness to make major changes to
American constitutional law. In Part I, I briefly review justifications for and
criticisms of the constitutional avoidance doctrine and survey the few decisions of
the Roberts Court thus far applying the doctrine. Part II describes in greater detail
the use of avoidance and anti-avoidance in NAMUDNO and Citizens United. Part
III explores the competing explanations for the Roberts Court’s selective use of
constitutional avoidance doctrine. Whether intended or not, the use of
constitutional avoidance and anti-avoidance allows the Court to control the speed
and intensity of constitutional and policy change.
I.
A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE DOCTRINE
AND ITS USE BY THE ROBERTS COURT
8
9

129 S Ct 1231 (2009).
129 S Ct 2658 (2009).
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Justifications for, and Criticisms of, the Avoidance Canon10

Roughly speaking, “canons” are rules of thumb or presumptions that
courts use to interpret the meaning of statutes. Constitutional avoidance (or the
“avoidance canon”) is a substantive canon of statutory interpretation. Substantive
canons “are generally meant to reflect a judicially preferred policy position.
[They] reflect judicially-based concerns, grounded in the courts’ understanding of
how to treat statutory text with reference to judicially perceived constitutional
priorities, pre-enactment common law practices, or specific statutorily based
policies.”11 Besides the avoidance canon, among the most important substantive
canons are the rule of lenity (a “rule against applying punitive sanctions if there is
ambiguity as to underlying criminal liability or criminal penalty”12) and a host of
“federalism” canons protecting state sovereignty against congressional
intrusion.13
Substantive canons stand in contrast to language canons, which “consist of
predictive guidelines as to what the legislature likely meant based on its choice of
certain words rather than others, or its grammatical configuration of those words
in a given sentence, or the relationship between those words and text found in
other parts of the same statute or in similar statutes.”14
Substantive canons are controversial.15 Eskridge and Frickey have
defended them as part of an “interpretive regime” serving rule-of-law and
coordination functions.16 That is, substantive canons can act as gap-filling devices
10

I do not intend here to give a full-blown examination to the avoidance canon. I rather sketch
the main arguments to provide relevant context for the remainder of this Article. This section
appears in similar form in Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 Stan L Rev 69 (2009).
11
James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral
Reasoning, 58 Vand L Rev 1, 13 (2005).
12
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, & Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials On
Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy App. B 32 (West 4th ed. 2007).
13
Id at App. B 30-32; see also below Parts III & IV.
14
Brudney & Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 12 (cited in note 11). One of the most important
language canons is the expessio unius canon, “the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion
of others.” Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at App. B 19 (cited
in note 12) (“expressio unius est exclusio alterius”). Justice Scalia gives this example, “What [the
expressio unius canon] means is this: If you see a sign that says children under twelve may enter
free, you should have no need to ask whether your thirteen-year-old must pay. The inclusion of
the one class is an implicit exclusion of the other.” Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:
Federal Courts and the Law 25 (Princeton U Press 1997).
15
Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at 945 (cited in note 12)
(describing “intellectual warfare” over the canons).
16
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term Foreword: Law
as Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 26, 66 (1994).
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that provide clarity for the law and allow courts to signal policy preferences to
legislatures, which may draft around such preferences when desired.17 Eskridge
further defends them as “a way for ‘public values’ drawn from the Constitution,
federal statutes, and the common law to play an important role in statutory
interpretation.”18
In contrast, Justice Scalia argues against substantive canons, which he
characterizes as “the use of certain presumptions and rules of construction that
load the dice for or against a particular result.”19 Calling substantive canons “a
lot of trouble” to “the honest textualist,”20 Justice Scalia describes them
indeterminate,21 leading to “unpredictability, if not arbitrariness” of judicial
decisions. He also questions “where courts get the authority to impose them,”22
doubting whether courts can “really just decree we will interpret the laws that
Congress passes to mean more or less than they fairly say.”23
Despite these statements, Justice Scalia has approved of and repeatedly
applied the avoidance canon,24 as have all other current members of the Supreme
Court. The avoidance canon provides that courts in appropriate circumstances
should “avoid [statutory] interpretations that would render a statute
unconstitutional or that would raise serious constitutional difficulties.”25
Traditional supporters of the canon’s use raise three justifications.
“First, [the avoidance canon] may be a rule of thumb for ascertaining
legislative intent.”26 The underlying assumption is that Congress either prefers not
to press the limits of the Constitution in its statutes, or it prefers a narrowed (and
constitutional) version of its statutes to a statute completely stricken by Congress.
This is the rationale often raised by the Supreme Court in applying the canon.27

17

Id at 66-69.
Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at 48 (cited in note 12).
19
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 27 (cited in note 14).
20
Id at 28.
21
Id (“it is virtually impossible to expect uniformity and objectivity when there is added, on one
side or the other, a thumb of indeterminate weight”).
22
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 29 (cited in note 14).
23
Id.
24
Id at 20 n.22. See also Part I.B (discussing Justice Scalia’s opinions concerning the avoidance
canon).
25
Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at App. B 29 (cited in note
12). The next section describes the mechanics of the canon in greater detail.
26
Id at 918 (cited in note 12).
27
See for example Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 191 (1991) (“This canon is followed out of
respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.”); Clark
v Martinez, 543 US 371, 382 (2005) (“The canon is thus a means of giving effect to congressional
intent, not of subverting it.”).
18
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Second, the canon may provide “a low salience mechanism for giving
effect to what Larry Sager calls ‘underenforced constitutional norms.’”28 As
Eskridge explains: “While a Court that seeks to avoid judicial activism will be
reluctant to invalidate federal statutes in close cases, it might seek other ways to
protect constitutional norms.” One way is through canons of statutory
construction.”29 Avoidance in effect remands the statute to Congress. The canon
“makes it harder for Congress to enact constitutionally questionable statutes and
forces legislatures to reflect and deliberate before plunging into constitutionally
sensitive issues.”30
Third, the canon may help “courts conserve their institutional capital,”31
what I term the “political legitimacy” rationale. Phil Frickey has defended the
early Warren Court avoidance decisions (many involving government action
against Communists32) on legitimacy grounds, seeing avoidance as allowing “the
[Warren] Court to slow down a political process that is moving too hastily and
overriding human rights, but without incurring the full wrath of a political process
that doesn’t like to be thwarted.”33
Much other recent scholarship has expressed skepticism about the
avoidance canon, at least as traditionally defended. Fred Schauer rejects the
assumption that the avoidance canon furthers congressional intent, in the absence
of any evidence that Congress would prefer a narrow interpretation of its statute
to a Court actually confronting whether the statute passes constitutional muster.34
28

Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at 918 (cited in note 12).
William G. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 286 (Harvard U Press 1994).
30
Id.
31
Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at 918 (cited in note 12).
32
See Neal Devins, Constitutional Avoidance and the Roberts Court, 32 U Dayton L Rev 339-40
(2007) (“During the 1956-1957 term of the Warren Court, twelve cases were decided involving
Communists. The Court ruled against the government in every case, though never on
constitutional grounds.”).
33
Id, citing Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Cal L Rev
397 (2005).
34
Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 S Ct Rev 71, 74; see also id at 92-93 (“there is
no evidence whatsoever that members of Congress are risk-averse about the possibility that
legislation they believe to be wise policy will be invalidated by the courts. On the contrary, given
the essentially political nature of the job of legislating, and given that the American political
system does not penalize legislators for voting for good (in the eyes of the voters) policies that are
determined by the courts to be unconstitutional, one would expect members of Congress to be
anything but risk-averse. One would expect them to err on the side of assuming constitutionality
under conditions of uncertainty about what the courts are likely to do.”); Ernest A. Young,
Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Texas L
Rev 1549, 1581 (2000) (arguing that the canon might actually undermine congressional intent: “a
holding that constitutional doubts compel a narrow statutory construction has a ‘go ahead, make
29
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Judge Friendly worried that the canon would be applied selectively, making it
“have almost as many dangers as advantages.”35 Indeed, even Frickey rejects a
view of the avoidance canon as tool of judicial modesty: “the avoidance canon is
not so much a maxim of statutory interpretation as a tool of constitutional law…it
involves judicial lawmaking not judicial restraint; the outcomes it produces are at
least sometimes inconsistent with current congressional preferences; and it will
not always foster a deliberative congressional response.”36
Still other scholars, like Frickey, seek to rehabilitate the avoidance canon
through a realist view of the Court’s power of judicial lawmaking. Ernest Young,
like Frickey, believes that the avoidance canon is a tool of constitutional
adjudication, not statutory construction. Young views the avoidance canon as a
“resistance norm,” an intermediate constitutional rule “that raises obstacles to
particular governmental actions without barring those actions entirely.”37 Finally,
Trevor Morrison adopts what might be called a “fence around the Torah”38
defense of the canon: “the avoidance canon…guards the [constitutional]
boundaries by making it more difficult for Congress even to approach them.”39
In sum, though modern legislation scholars see the avoidance canon as
sometimes playing an important role in Supreme Court adjudication and its
relation with Congress, there seems to be consensus that the canon’s use signals a
Court that is actively engaged in shaping law and policy, not acting modestly.
B.

The Scope of the Modern Avoidance Doctrine

I turn now away from the rationale for the avoidance canon and to its
mechanics. There are two main mechanical questions about when the canon
my day’ quality to it, and Congress might reasonably conclude that enactment of the broader
reading would only result in invalidation on the merits”).
35
Henry Friendly, Benchmarks 211 (U Chicago Press 1967). Judge Friendly remarked that
challenging the avoidance canon “is rather like challenging the Holy Writ,” id, but he worried that
wide use of the rule would become one of “evisceration and tergiversation.” Id at 212; see also
Lisa Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 BC L Rev 1003 (1994).
36
Frickey, 93 Cal L Rev at 402 (cited in note 33).
37
Young, 78 Texas L Rev at 1585 (cited in note 34).
38
In Jewish religious tradition, the oral law provided additional rules to supplement the written
rules in the Torah and to make sure that those written rules were not violated. “The rabbis used
the metaphor of a fence around the Torah as a means of protecting the essence of Torah in the
midst of the proliferation of new demands.” Perke Avot: A Modern Commentary on Jewish Ethics
2 (Leonard Kravitz & Kerry M. Olitzky eds. and trans., URJ Press 1993).
39
Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum L Rev
1189, 1217 (2006); see also United States v Marshall, 908 F2d 1312, 1318 (7th Cir 1990)
(Easterbrook) (“The canon about avoiding constitutional decisions, in particular, must be used
with case, for it is closer cousin to invalidation than to interpretation. It is a way to enforce the
constitutional penumbra, and therefore an aspect of constitutional law proper.”).
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should be invoked: first, how much constitutional doubt must there be before the
canon comes into play? Second, must the statute in question be truly ambiguous
before the canon comes into play?
On the first point, Adrian Vermuele has traced the transformation of the
doctrine from “classical avoidance” to “modern avoidance.”40 Under classical
avoidance, a court would have to conclude that one interpretation of a statute
would render the statute unconstitutional before the canon may be applied. Under
modern avoidance doctrine in contrast, the canon may be applied once the court
concludes that one interpretation of the statute would raise serious doubts as to
the constitutionality of the statute. As Morrison explains, “modern avoidance
departs from classical avoidance by allowing serious but potentially unavailing
constitutional objections to dictate statutory meanings.”41
On the second question, the stated rule of the modern Court is that the
avoidance canon only comes into play only when the statutory interpretation that
avoids constitutional doubt is in fact reasonable or plausible:
The doctrine of constitutional doubt does not require that the
problem-avoiding construction be the preferable one—the one the
Court would adopt in any event. Such a standard would deprive
the doctrine of all function. “Adopt the interpretation that avoids
the constitutional doubt if it is the right one” produces precisely
the same result as “adopt the right interpretation.” Rather, the
doctrine of constitutional doubt comes into play when the statute is
“susceptible of” the problem-avoiding interpretation—when that
interpretation is reasonable, though not necessarily the best.42
As Justice Scalia put it for a majority of the Court in 2005, the canon “is a
tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text,

40

Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Georgetown LJ 1945, 1949 (1997).
Morrison, 106 Colum L Rev at 1203 (cited in note 39); see also John Nagle, Delaware &
Hudson Revisited, 72 Notre Dame L Rev 1495 (1997) (tracing history of “doubts” canon in
detail).
42
Almendarez-Torres v United States, 523 US 224, 270 (1998) (Scalia dissenting) (emphasis
added and citations omitted). Though Justice Scalia wrote this as part of his dissenting opinion,
on this point, the majority agreed: “[For the canon to apply, t]he statute must be genuinely
susceptible to two constructions after, and not before, its complexities are unraveled. Only then is
the statutory construction that avoids the constitutional question a ‘fair’ one.” Id at 238. The
majority and dissent disagreed in the Almendarez-Torres case over whether the statutory language
at issue pointed “significantly in one direction,” id., and over whether there was “grave[] doubt”
about the constitutionality of the statute under one of the interpretations. Id at 239.
41
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resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative
which raises serious constitutional doubts.”43
Despite the formal requirement of some kind of textual ambiguity to allow
for the Court to adopt one of two reasonable interpretations, Frickey explains that
“for the [Warren] Court…statutory textual ambiguity is not a necessary condition
for invoking the canon. Instead, what is needed is a judicial conclusion that
Congress had not actively considered—and ideally, deliberated on—a matter of
‘grave importance,’ especially when that involves underenforced constitutional
norms.”44
The most recent extended Supreme Court debate over the scope of the
avoidance canon occurred in 2005, during the last few months of the Rehnquist
Court, in the case of Clark v Martinez.45 An alien who has been found to be
inadmissible into the United States ordinarily must be removed from the country
within 90 days.46 Clark concerned an immigration statute providing the Secretary
of Homeland Security may detain an alien who has been found to be removable
beyond this statutory 90-day removal period.47 Detained aliens who had never
legally been admitted into the United States challenged “the Secretary [of
Homeland Security]’s authority to continue to [indefinitely] detain an
inadmissible alien subject to a removal order after the 90-day removal period has
elapsed.”48 The Clark Court followed an earlier Supreme Court opinion
construing the same statute to hold that aliens who had initially gained lawful
entry in the U.S. presumptively could not be detained under the statute for more
than six months after the 90-day removal period.49 In Clark, the Court held that
the same rule applied to aliens who had never gained lawful entry to the
country—even though the Secretary would not necessarily violate the
Constitution by holding such aliens for a period exceeding six months.
In reaching the conclusion that the six-month presumptive period applied
to aliens who had never gained lawful entry into the country, the Clark Court
applied the avoidance canon. The Court noted that the contrary interpretation of
the statute urged by the government—allowing detention for more than six
months—would raise serious constitutional concerns for aliens who had been
lawfully been admitted into the country. “If [one of two plausible statutory
constructions] would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other

43

Clark v Martinez, 543 US 371, 382 (2005) (emphasis added).
Frickey, 93 Cal L Rev at 460-61 (cited in note 33).
45
543 US 371 (2005).
46
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)
47
8 USC § 1231(a)(6).
48
Clark, 543 US at 372.
49
Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678 (2001).
44
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should prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the
particular litigant before the Court.”50
The dissenters viewed this aspect of the Court’s ruling as an “end run
around black-letter constitutional doctrine governing facial and as-applied
challenges.”51 To the dissenters “an ambiguous statute should be read to avoid a
constitutional doubt only if the statute is constitutionally doubtful as applied to
the litigant before the court.”52 The dissenters argued that because the aliens
before the Court in Clark could be held longer than six months without raising
constitutional concerns, these aliens should not be able to rely upon the avoidance
canon.
The majority rejected the dissent’s argument, holding that application of
the avoidance canon furthered congressional intent: “when a litigant invokes the
canon of avoidance, he is not attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of
others, as the dissent believes; he seeks to vindicate his own statutory rights.”53
To the majority, the Court should presume Congress did not write a statute that
would be unconstitutional in some of its applications. The majority also pointed
to an administrative concern with the dissent’s contrary rule, stating that the
dissent’s rule would “render every statute a chameleon, its meaning subject to
change depending on the presence or absence of constitutional concerns in each
individual case.”54
The Court’s interesting disagreement in Clark over the relationship
between the avoidance canon and as-applied challenges should not obscure the
Court’s unanimity on basic points related to the avoidance canon. All the Justices
on the Clark Court accepted the avoidance canon as a legitimate tool of statutory
interpretation and all believed it applied in cases there were two “plausible”
interpretations of a statute, one of which raises serious constitutional doubts.
(They differed only in whether those doubts had to involve the litigants before the
Court.) Given this agreement on the fundamental contours of the avoidance
canon, the Roberts Court has repeatedly cited to Clark for the black-letter of the
avoidance canon.
C.

Constitutional Avoidance and the Roberts Court

The Roberts Court has not yet had the occasion to engage in any great
debates about the meaning of the avoidance canon, but the canon was mentioned
50

Clark, 543 US at 380-81.
Id at 394 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52
Id.
53
Id at 382.
54
Id.
51
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in 13 cases from January 2006 to June 2009.55 The most important discussions of
the canon thus far in the Roberts Court have come in controversial cases
involving abortion, the detainment of unlawful enemy combatants at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, and in race cases.
In Gonzales v Carhart, the Court relied on the avoidance canon to
interpret a federal abortion statute not to apply to certain abortion procedures.
Justice Kennedy, for the majority, first quoted an earlier Court case for the
proposition that it is an “elementary rule …. that every reasonable construction
must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”56 He
added that the avoidance canon “in the past has fallen by the wayside when the
Court confronted a statute regulating abortion. The Court at times employed an
antagonistic canon of construction under which in cases involving abortion, a
permissible reading of a statute [was] to be avoided at all costs.”57 Here, as
described more in Part III below, Justice Kennedy recognized the occasional
Court use of the anti-avoidance tool in the abortion context.
In Boumediene v Bush, the Court held that it could not construe the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, applicable to enemy combatants being held by
55

Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243, 291-92 (2006) (Scalia dissenting) (arguing that the canon did
not apply to Attorney General directive on assisted suicide); Kansas v Marsh, 548 US 163, 169
(2006) (describing Kansas Supreme Court’s use of the doctrine); Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US
557, 584 n.15 (2006) (declining to decide “the manner in which the canon of constitutional
avoidance should affect subsequent interpretation of the” Detainee Treatment Act); Rita v United
States, 551 US 338 (2007) (Scalia dissenting) (criticizing majority for failure to follow Clark v
Martinez rule); Office of Senator Mark Dayton v Hanson, 550 US 511, 514 (2007) (Court
unanimously following Clark for “our established practice of interpreting statutes to avoid
constitutional difficulties”); Gonzales v Carhart, 550 US 124, 153-54 (2007) (relying on
avoidance canon to interpret federal abortion statute not to apply to certain abortion procedures);
Gonzalez v United States, 128 S Ct 1765, 1771 (2008) (declining to apply avoidance canon
because there was no serious constitutional doubt raised by one of the interpretations);
Boumediene v Bush, 128 S Ct 2229, 2271-72 (2008) (declining to apply canon when the text and
purpose require a contrary interpretation); Pearson v Callahan, 129 S Ct 808 821 (2008)
(unanimous Court endorsing Justice Brandeis’s statement in Ashwander v TVA, 297 US 288, 347
(1936) that “The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
of”); Bartlett v Strickland, 129 S Ct 1231, 1247-48 (2008) (relying on avoidance canon in
declining to read section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to allow influence district claims); Hawaii v
Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S Ct 1436, 1445 (2008) (applying Clark’s avoidance statement
to congressional resolution concerning apology to Hawaii); Federal Communications Comm’n v
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S Ct 1800, 1811-12 (2009) (holding that avoidance canon does
not apply to “limit the scope of authorized executive action); Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District Number One v Holder, 129 S Ct 2504 (2009) (applying avoidance canon to section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act).
56
550 US at 153.
57
Id at 153-54 (internal quotations omitted).
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the United States in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to give detainees at the Court of
Appeals the “right to present relevant exculpatory evidence that was not
presented” at an early military tribunal.58 The Court held that in applying the
avoidance canon to the DTA, “[w]e cannot ignore the text and purpose of the
statute in order to save it.”59 The majority concluded that “[t]he language of the
statute, read in light of Congress’s reasons for enacting it” cannot bear the
interpretation that allowed the presentation of such evidence.60 Accordingly the
Court reached the constitutional question and held the procedure in the DTA that
barred detainees from presenting exculpatory evidence to the Court of Appeals
was unconstitutional.
In Bartlett v Strickland,61 the Court applied the avoidance canon to
conclude that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act did not allow plaintiffs to raise
“crossover district claims,” which would have had the effect of creating more
electoral districts in which members of minority groups could elect candidates of
their choice.62 “If § 2 were interpreted to require crossover districts throughout
the nation, it would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting,
raising serious constitutional questions.”63 Such an interpretation “would reverse
the canon of avoidance. It invites the divisive constitutional questions that are
both unnecessary and contrary to the purposes of our precedents under the Voting
Rights Act.”64 Similarly, in NAMUDNO, described fully in Part II below, the
Court relied heavily upon the avoidance canon to reach its surprising
interpretation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
Finally, though the word “avoidance” does not appear in the opinions, the
avoidance canon was in play the Supreme Court’s most prominent race case of
the October 2008 term, Ricci v DeStefano.65 In the so-called “New Haven
firefighters case,” the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did
58

128 S Ct at 2271-72.
Id at 2271.
60
Id at 2274.
61
129 S Ct 1231 (2009) (plurality).
62
The Court set forth the statutory question this way: “In a district that is not a majority-minority
district, if a racial minority could elect its candidate of choice with support from crossover
majority voters, can § 2 require the district to be drawn to accommodate this potential?” Id at
1238.
63
Id at 1247 (internal quotations omitted).
64
Id at 1248. Though not phrased in explicit avoidance terms, the issue arose in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion involving a controversial Texas re-redistricting plan. LULAC v Perry, 548 US
399,446 (2006) (Kennedy) (plurality) (“Accordingly, the ability to aid in Frost’s election does not
make the old District 24 an African-American opportunity district for purposes of § 2. If § 2 were
interpreted to protect this kind of influence, it would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every
redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions.”).
65
129 S Ct 2658 (2009).
59
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not allow the city to throw out the result of a test used to identify firefighters for
promotion, after the test showed white candidates outperformed minority
candidates. Plaintiffs claimed that throwing out the test results violated both Title
VII and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court declined to reach the constitutional question,
citing a 1984 voting rights case, Escambia County, stating that “normally the
Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon
which to dispose of the case.”66 The Court then applied a new test for judging
Title VII claims,67 thereby avoiding the constitutional question. The Ricci
opinion noted two more times that “we need not decide” the constitutional
question in this case.68
In his Ricci concurrence, Justice Scalia noted the tension between Title
VII’s requirements for race-conscious employment decisions and his view of the
Equal Protection Clause. “The Court’s resolution of these cases makes it
unnecessary to resolve these matters today. But the war between disparate impact
and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin
thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”69

II.
NAMUDNO AND CITIZENS UNITED:
AVOIDANCE AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE
Against the backdrop set forth in Part I, I now consider in detail how
unusual the Court’s actions in NAMUDNO and Citizens United actually were
compared to the Supreme Court’s usual constitutional avoidance cases.
A.

NAMUDNO

In 1965, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act.70 Section 5 of the VRA
requires that “covered jurisdictions” obtain preclearance from the federal
66

Id, citing Escambia County v McMillan, 466 US 48, 52 (1984) (per curiam). Escambia County
was an interesting case because “[t]he parties did not brief or argue the statutory question on
appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded the matter to the appellate court,
instructing the court to consider first whether it could affirm the district court based solely on the
Voting Rights Act.” Kloppenberg, 35 BC L Rev at 1029 (cited in note 35).
67
Linda Greenhouse, Who Called Off the Charge?, “The Breakfast Table,” Slate, June 29, 2009,
online at http://www.slate.com/id/2220927/entry/2221819/ (visited Sept. 1, 2009).
68
Ricci, 129 S Ct at 2664, 2676.
69
Id at 2683 (Scalia concurring).
70

42 USC §§ 1973–1973p (2004).
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government before making any changes in voting practices or procedures,71 for
changes as major as a 10-year redistricting plan or as minor as moving a polling
place across the street. For each one, the covered jurisdiction must demonstrate
that the change was made without a discriminatory purpose and that it will not
make the affected minority groups worse off. Section 5’s aim was to prevent state
and local governments with a history of discrimination against racial minorities
from changing their voting rules without first proving that such changes would
have neither a discriminatory purpose nor effect.
Some southern states immediately challenged parts of the VRA as
exceeding congressional power. In the first of these cases, South Carolina v
Katzenbach, South Carolina challenged core provisions of the Act, including the
preclearance provision.72 The Court rejected South Carolina’s argument that the
challenged provisions “exceed[ed] the powers of Congress and encroach[ed] on
an area reserved to the States by the Constitution.”73 It held that Congress had
acted appropriately under its powers granted in Section Two of the Fifteenth
Amendment.74 In so holding, the Court gave considerable deference to
congressional determinations about the means necessary to “enforce” the
Fifteenth Amendment.
Over the years, Congress continued to renew Section 5, adding in
additional coverage areas. In 1982, Congress renewed the provision for a 25-year
period, expiring in 2007. The City of Rome, Georgia challenged the renewed
preclearance provision and the Court again rejected the challenge.75 Then-Justice
Rehnquist dissented, raising federalism concerns.76
In the years since City of Rome, the Supreme Court underwent a
federalism revolution, narrowing Congressional power over the states. Beginning
with City of Boerne v Flores,77 the Court has limited Congress to passing
“remedial” statutes. It has rejected congressional attempts to expand the scope of
constitutional rights through legislation beyond that which is “congruen[t] and
proportional[]”78 to remedy intentional unconstitutional discrimination by the
states. In Board of Trustees v Garrett,79 the Court indicated that it will search for
an adequate evidentiary record to support a congressional determination that

71

Id at § 1973c.

72

South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 307 (1966).

73

Id at 323.

74

Id at 337.
75
City of Rome v United States, 446 US 156, 187 (1980).
76

Id at 210-15 (Rehnquist dissenting).

77

521 US 507, 519 (1997).

78

Id at 520.

79

531 US 356, 373 n.8 (2001).
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states are engaging in sufficient intentionally unconstitutional conduct so as to
justify congressional regulation.
Because of these new standards, many election law scholars worried that
unless Congress made changes to the existing section 5 regime, a renewed section
5 could be struck down as unconstitutional.80 Though Congress did make some
changes to section 5 when it renewed the Act in 2006, such as rejecting an earlier
Supreme Court interpretation of the applicable section 5 standard in Georgia v
Ashcroft,81 it did not make changes to two key provisions of the Act which would
have updated the Act to account for changed political realties. First, Congress did
not change the coverage formula for which jurisdictions must engage in
preclearance. That formula used data from the 1964, 1968, or 1972 elections.82
Second, Congress did not consider ways to make it easier for jurisdictions that
have been covered to “bail out” from coverage under the Act, such as by putting
the onus on the federal government to prepare a list of jurisdictions presumptively
entitled to bail out because of their good record on voting and race.83 These were
politically sensitive subjects, and it appears that Congress did not have any
political incentive in taking a close look at these difficult race and politics
questions84 before reauthorizing section 5 for another 25 years by a wide
margin.85

80

Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting
Rights Act after Tennessee v. Lane, 66 Ohio St L J L.J. 177 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 Colum L Rev 1710 (2005), The
Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (2006) (statement of Richard H. Pildes). See generally The
Future of the Voting Rights Act (David Epstein et al., eds., Russell Sage Foundation 2008).
81
Georgia v Ashcroft, 549 US 461 (2003). See 42 USCA § 1973c(b) (West Supp. 2007). For an
exhaustive look at how the renewed section 5 deals with the Georgia v. Ashcroft precedent, see
Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L J 174
(2007).
82
42 USCA § 1973c(a).
83
See Richard Hasen, Pass the VRA Bailout Amendment, Roll Call, July 11, 2006, online at
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/bailout.pdf (visited Sept 1, 2009).
84
Persily, 117 Yale L J 174 (cited in note 81); Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance,
Constitutional Theory, and the VRA, 117 Yale L J Pocket Pt 148 (2007), online at
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/12/10/pildes.html (visited Sept 1, 2009).
85
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Mukasey, 573 F Supp 2d 221, 229
(D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge court) (“in July 2006 Congress extended section 5 for an additional
twenty-five years. Entitled the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, the statute, which passed
overwhelmingly in both chambers (unanimously in the Senate and by 390–33 in the House),
overruled several Supreme Court decisions interpreting section 5’s substantive test, but otherwise
left the law virtually unchanged. 2006 Amendments, 120 Stat. at 577. President George W. Bush
signed the bill into law on July 27, 2006.”).
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Soon after Congress passed the renewed section 5, the Project on Fair
Representation, a group ideologically opposed to section 5 as impermissible racebased legislation, backed litigation to challenge section 5 as exceeding
congressional power under the Fifteenth Amendment.86 As obscure Austin utility
district, the Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One, brought the
challenge, which was initially heard by a three-judge federal district court in
Washington D.C. Though its main argument was against the continued
constitutionality of the preclearance provision of section 5, the utility district also
argued it should be entitled to bail out from coverage under the Act as a “political
subdivision” covered by section 5.
The three-judge court in NAMUDNO v Mukasey, in an exhaustive and
unanimous opinion, rejected both arguments.87 The court spent 5 pages
addressing the bailout question, and then 48 pages addressing the thorny
constitutional question (with the remainder of the opinion consisting of maps and
appendices). For purposes of this Article, I examine only the bailout analysis.
In addressing the argument of the utility district that it should be allowed
to bail out, the court began by noting that until 1982, section 4(a) of the Act
“limited bailout to two types of entities (1) covered states, and (2) political
subdivisions covered ‘as a separate unit.’”88 Section 14(c)(2) of the VRA defines
“political subdivision” to “mean any county or parish, except that where
registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or
parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of the state which conducts
registration for voting.” “As a result, [under the pre-1982 version of section 4(a)
of the VRA] only political subdivisions separately designated for coverage could
seek bailout. So, for example, Texas could seek bailout as a covered state…But
political subdivisions within covered states—such as Travis County, in which the
District is located—could not apply for bailout despite meeting the section
14(c)(2) definition because they had never been separately designated for
coverage.”89 The court confirmed this understanding of the section 4(a) bailout
86

See Chuck Lindell, Star Lawyer Makes Supreme Court Splash, Austin-American Statesman,
July
5,
2009,online
at
http://www.statesman.com/news/content/news/stories/local/2009/07/05/0705coleman.html
(visited Sept 1, 2009) (“When he has a choice of cases, [utility district lawyer Greg] Coleman said
he looks for pro bono work that fits his philosophy. He took the Voting Rights Act case largely
for free, with only a ‘five-figure’ contribution for expenses from the Project on Fair
Representation, an advocacy group that challenges race-based government policies, Coleman
said.”).
87
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Mukasey, 573 F.Supp.2d 221
(D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge court).
88
Id at 230. Some covered jurisdictions include only parts of states, explaining the second type of
entity.
89
Id at 231.
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provision by citing to the Supreme Court’s City of Rome case, in which the Court
held that the city of Rome, Georgia “was ineligible to seek bailout because the
coverage formula of § 4(b) ha[d] never been applied to it.”90
“In 1982, however, Congress expanded bailout eligibility to include
section 14(c)(2) political subdivisions within covered states”91 by adding
language to section 4(a) allowing bailout by “any political subdivision of such
State…, though such determinations were not made with respect to such
subdivision as a separate unit.”92 As the court explained, “[b]y including political
subdivisions within covered states even though they had not been designated for
coverage ‘as a separate unit,” Congress made jurisdictions like Travis County
eligible to seek bailout.”93
The utility district in NAMUDNO conceded it did not qualify, like Travis
County, as a “political subdivision” under section 14(c)(2) because it was not a
county and it never conducted registration for voting. The utility district
nonetheless argued that it constituted a “political subdivision” in the ordinary
meaning of that term and therefore could bail out.94 In support of the argument,
the utility district cited to a 1978 Supreme Court case, United States v Board of
Commissioners of Sheffield Alabama,95 a case in which the Supreme Court held
that “once a state has been designated for coverage, section 5’s preclearance
requirement applies to all political units within it regardless of whether the units
qualify as section 14(c)(2) political subdivisions.”96 The utility district focused
on dictum in Sheffield stating that “section 14(c)(2)’s definition ‘was intended to
operate only for purposes of determining which political units in nondesignated
states may be separately designated for coverage under § 4(b).’”97 The utility
district argued that when Congress amended the bailout provisions of the VRA, it
did so “in light of Sheffield’s dictum that the only purpose of section 14(c)(2)’s
definition is to identify which political subunits qualify for coverage,”98 and
therefore section 14(c)(2) was no bar to the court holding it should be considered
a “political subdivision” entitled to seek bailout under section 4(a).
The district court rejected this argument on numerous grounds. First, the
court offered a textual analysis, stating that the utility district’s definition would
render the phrase in the amended statute “though [the coverage] determinations
90

Id (citing City of Rome, 446 US at 167).
Id
92
1982 Amendments § 2(b)(2), 96 Stat. at 131 (codified at 42 USC § 1973b(a)(1)).
93
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Mukasey, 573 F.Supp.2d at 231.
94
Id.
95
435 US 110 (1978).
96
Northwest Austin, 573 F Supp 2d at 232.
97
Id at 232.
98
Id.
91
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were not made with respect to such subdivision as a separate unit” as
impermissible surplusage.99 In other words, if Congress intended to allow all
political subdivisions (and not just section 14(c)(2) subdivisions) to be eligible for
bailout, it did not need to include that extra clause. “This language demonstrates
that Congress intended ‘political subdivision’ to refer only to section 14(c)(2)
subdivisions—that is, counties, parishes, and voter-registering subunits—since
only ‘such subdivision[s]’ can be separately designated for coverage.”100
The court also pointed to unambiguous statements in House and Senate
Reports accompanying the 1982 amendments which “clarify that Congress
intended the expanded bailout mechanism to encompass only section 14(c)(2)
political subdivisions.”101 For example, the Senate Report states that:
Towns and cities within counties may not bailout separately. This
is a logistical limit. As a practical matter, if every political
subdivision were eligible to seek separate bailout, we could not
expect that the Justice Department or private groups could
remotely hope to monitor and to defend the bailout suits. It would
be one thing for the Department and outside civil rights litigators
to appear in hundreds of bailout suits. It would be quite another for
them to have to face many thousands of such actions because each
of the smallest political subunits could separately bail out. Few
questioned the reasonableness and fairness of this cutoff in the
House.102
The district court concluded its discussion by noting that the Attorney
General issued a regulation confirming that only section 14(c)(2) jurisdictions
may seek bailout, and that the Supreme Court has traditionally afforded
substantial deference to the Attorney General’s interpretation of section 5.103 The
court also noted that Congress was silent in 2006 when it reauthorized the Voting
Rights Act in light of the practice of bailout by eleven Virginia political
subdivisions that relied upon the Attorney General’s interpretation.104 Congress
did so despite the fact that two witnesses unsuccessfully urged Congress “to

99

Id.
Id.
101
Id at 232-33.
102
Id at 233 (citing S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 57 n. 192, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p.
235 no. 192).
103
Id.
104
Id at 233-34.
100

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436669

20

CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE

expand bailout eligibility to encompass governmental units smaller than counties
and parishes.”105
“Given this extensive evidence of clear legislative intent—both textual
and historical—we need say little about Sheffield.”106 The court dismissed the
Sheffield statement as dicta, and concluded that “[i]n any event, even if, as
Sheffield’s dictum suggests, section 14(c)(2)’s definition originally operated only
to identify entities eligible for coverage, the amended section 4(a)’s text and
legislative history make clear that Congress used that definition in 1982 for an
additional purpose: to identify those entitles eligible to seek bailout.”107
In light of the statutory tour de force of the district court, voting rights
experts believed that the statutory bailout argument had no chance when
NAMUDNO was appealed to the Supreme Court.108 Instead, it seemed
unavoidable that the Court would address the constitutionality of the renewed
section 5.
At oral argument, Justice Souter pushed the bailout argument,109 but the
conservative members of the Court, led by the Chief Justice, focused instead on
the constitutional questions and severely criticized section 5.110 In addition to
105

Id at 234.
Id at 234.
107
Id. The court also rejected the utility district’s arguments that it should rely on Texas law’s
definition of political subdivision, and that accepting the government’s definition of political
subdivision for section 5 purposes would interfere with application of section 2 of the Act.
108
See Heather Gerken, The Supreme Court Punts on Section 5, Balkinization, June 22, 2009,
online at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/supreme-court-punts-on-section-5.html (visited Sept
1, 2009) (“the statutory argument is one that that almost no one (save Greg Coleman, the lawyer
who argued the case and who is now entitled to be described as a mad genius) thought was
particularly tenable because of prior Court opinions.”); Richard L. Hasen, Sordid Business: Will
the Supreme Court Kill the Voting Rights Act?, Slate, Apr. 27, 2009, online at
http://www.slate.com/id/2216888/ (“Since there’s no good statutory loophole, the larger
constitutional question seems unavoidable.”).
109
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Holder, Oral Argument Transcript,
Apr.
29,
2009,
at
14,
online
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-322.pdf (visited Sept 1,
2009) (“Well Mr. Coleman, this is important to me. Do you — do you acknowledge that if we
find on your favor on the bailout point we need not reach the constitutional point?”).
110
Justice Ginsburg also offered some cogent criticisms of the statutory bailout argument, along
the lines of the district court’s analysis of the issue. See for example id at 4 (“And what do you do
with a statute that has three categories — the State, political subdivision, and then there’s
‘governmental unit’? The district qualifies as a governmental unit. Why would Congress add that
third category if the district came within ‘political subdivision’?”); id at 4-5 (“the statute does use
the term ‘governmental unit’ to encompass districts. And if they were also subdivisions, why
would Congress need to add an additional category?”); id at 8 (“There was a proposal [in 2006],
was there not, to allow governmental units to bail out — to allow anyone who was required to
preclear to bail out?”); id at 9 (“The Department of Justice has — does it — does it not have a
106
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asking Debo Agebile, counsel for the NAACP whether “it your position that
today southerners are more likely to discriminate than northerners,”111 the Chief
Justice remarked: “Counsel, … our decision in City of Boerne said that action
under section 5 has to be congruent and proportional to what it’s trying to
remedy. Here, as I understand it, one-twentieth of 1 percent of the submissions
are not precleared. That, to me, suggests that they are sweeping far more broadly
than they need to, to address the intentional discrimination under the Fifteenth
Amendment.”112 Once Justice Kennedy weighed in repeatedly with questions
about whether preclearance undermined the sovereignty and dignity of the
covered states,113 most Court watchers predicted a 5-4 decision striking down
section 5 of the Act on constitutional grounds.114
In a surprising and relatively short opinion, however, the Court on an 8-1
vote decided NAMUDNO on statutory grounds, ruling that the utility district was
entitled to bail out.115 Justice Thomas, speaking only for himself, would have
held section 5 unconstitutional.116
The Court’s opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, begins by stating
the avoidance canon in an interesting way that fails to mention the need for a
plausible interpretation of a statute to avoid deciding constitutional questions.117
“Our usual practice is to avoid the unnecessary resolution of constitutional
questions.”118 After 5 pages of background, the Court turned to give a detailed
explanation of the serious constitutional questions raised by the case. The court
noted that the “Act … differentiates between the States, despite our historic
tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”119 It said a departure from
this principle “requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”120 It flagged the federalism
regulation that contradicts your reading? And hasn’t that been out there wasn’t it out there before
the 2006 extension?”). Justice Ginsburg must have swallowed hard before signing the opinion of
the Court.
111
Id at 48.
112
Id at 27.
113
See for example id at 34 (statement of Justice Kennedy) (“Congress has made a finding that the
sovereignty of Georgia is less than the sovereign dignity of Ohio.”).
114
Adam Liptak, Skepticism at Court on Validity of Vote Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, online
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/us/30voting.html (visited Sept. 1, 2009) (“A central
provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, designed to protect minorities in states with a history
of discrimination, is at substantial risk of being struck down as unconstitutional, judging from the
questioning on Wednesday at the Supreme Court.”).
115
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Holder, 129 S Ct 2504 (2009).
116
Id at 2517 (Thomas concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117
See above Part I.B.
118
NAMUDNO, 129 S Ct at 2508.
119
Id at 2512.
120
Id.
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concerns and noted the danger that “[t]he evil that §5 is meant to address may no
longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”121 After
noting that the coverage formula is 35 years old and possibly outdated, the Court
noted that “Congress heard warnings from supporters of extending § 5 that
evidence in the record did not address” differences between covered and noncovered states.122
Following this discussion raising serious doubts about section 5’s
constitutionality, the opinion stated that “we are keenly mindful of our
institutional role. We fully appreciate that judging the Constitutionality of an Act
of Congress is the ‘gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to
perform.’”123 Then, as in Ricci,124 the Court cited Escambia County for the
proposition that the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some
other ground to dispose of the case.125 Again, there was no mention of the need
for a plausible interpretation of the statute.
The Court then offered a superficial textual analysis of the bailout
question. The Court did not discuss the textual analysis offered by the district
court. Nor did it quote from and examine the legislative history showing
Congress’s unambiguous intent to limit bailout to states and political subdivisions
that register voters. The Court also ignored the Department of Justice’s
regulations stating that only jurisdictions that register voters may bail out, and
refused to afford any deference to such regulations.
Instead, the Court began by conceding that if section 4(a) were considered
in isolation, “the District Court’s approach might well be correct. But here,
specific precedent, the structure of the Voting Rights Act, and the underlying
constitutional concerns compel a broader reading of the statute.”126 The Court
121

Id.
Id. The Court then noted that it was an open question whether the congruence and
proportionality standard or an easier rational basis review might apply to the constitutional
question. Id.
123
Id at 2512-13 (quoting Blodgett v Holden, 275 US 142, 147-148 (1927) (Holmes concurring)).
124
See note 65 above.
125
The majority and Justice Thomas then debated whether a finding on bailout for the utility
district would dispose of the case. Citing a concession by the utility district, the majority
concluded it would do so. See NAMUDNO, 129 S Ct at 2513; see also id at 2517-18 (Thomas
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126
Id at 2513. The Court began the section with the statement that “‘Statutory definitions control
the meaning of statutory words, of course, in the usual case. But this is an unusual case.’ Lawson
v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201, 69 S.Ct. 503, 93 L.Ed. 611 (1949); see also
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 764, 69 S.Ct. 1274, 93 L.Ed. 1672
(1949); Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 412, 103 S.Ct. 2476, 76 L.Ed.2d 678
(1983).” But those cases involved statutory readings that went against the main purposes of the
statute, in a way that the interpretation of the bailout provision did not. In Lawson, the Court
refused to construe a provision in a statute governing disability payments in a way that would
122
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then relied upon the dicta in Sheffield,127 and stated that the Court confirmed that
dicta in another 1978 case.128 The Court then appeared to concede that these
dicta went against the Court’s later City of Rome holding,129 which seemed to
foreclose the utility district’s argument that it could bail out as a “political
subdivision.” But the Court then came up with this deus ex machina:
In 1982, however, Congress expressly repudiated City of Rome
and instead embraced “piecemeal” bailout. As part of an overhaul
of the bailout provision, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act
to expressly provide that bailout was also available to “political
subdivisions” in a covered State, “though [coverage]
determinations were not made with respect to such subdivision as a
separate unit.” Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 96 Stat.
131, codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1973b(a)(1) (emphasis added). In
other words, Congress decided that a jurisdiction covered because
it was within a covered State need not remain covered for as long
as the State did. If the subdivision met the bailout requirements, it
could bail out, even if the State could not. In light of these
amendments, our logic for denying bailout in City of Rome is no
longer applicable to the Voting Rights Act—if anything, that logic
compels the opposite conclusion.
This paragraph is not at all supportable by the text of the statute or the
legislative history.130 There was no “express repudiation” of City of Rome in the
“create obvious incongruities in the language, and would destroy one of the major purposes of the
second injury provision: the prevention of employer discrimination against handicapped workers.
We have concluded that Congress would not have intended such a result.” In McComb, the Court
looked to legislative history to confirm the meaning of the statute. In Shacket, the Court refused
to construe a statute to “defeat the purpose of the legislation.”
127
See notes 95-106 above.
128
NAMUDNO, 129 S Ct at 2514 (citing Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v White, 439 US 32
(1978)).
129
Id at 2515 (“Even if that is what City of Rome held…).
130
The Court ended its brief analysis by setting up a strawman argument: “The Government
contends that this reading of Sheffield is mistaken, and that the district is subject to § 5 under our
decision in Sheffield not because it is a ‘political subdivision’ but because it is a ‘State.’ That
would mean it could bail out only if the whole State could bail out.” Id at 2516. But that is not
what the government argued. Instead, the government offered the following reading of Sheffield:
“Sheffield held that, in light of the statutory structure and purposes, ‘§ 5’s preclearance
requirement for electoral changes by a covered ‘State’ reached all such changes made by political
units in that State.” Ibid.; see Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 127 (‘[T]he reference to ‘State’ in § 5 includes
political
units
within
it.’).”
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text of the 1982 renewal. Indeed, City of Rome is not mentioned in the Senate
Report as being repudiated.131 Congress is not shy about mentioning statutory
Supreme Court precedent it is overturning: The 1982 Senate Report is full of
references to overturning City of Mobile v Bolden,132 and the 2006 text of the
VRA renewal itself (not to mention the legislative history) is full of references to
overturning Georgia v Ashcroft.133 The Court pointed to no evidence in the
legislative materials of an express repudiation of City of Rome.
Nor was there any implicit repudiation of City of Rome. As illustrated by
the district court opinion, all of the legislative history—ignored by the Court—
points in the exact contrary direction to the analysis of the Court. It could not
have been clearer when both the House and Senate Report accompanying the
1982 VRA is that the “standard for bail-out is broadened to permit political
subdivisions, as defined in Section 14(c)(2), in covered states to seek bailout
although the state itself may remain covered.”134 The Supreme Court’s
interpretation also went against the accepted understanding of the Act, as codified
in the Attorney General’s regulations.
Perhaps what is most remarkable about this statutory interpretation is the
conspiracy of silence on the Court. No Justice, not even Justice Thomas in his
partial dissent, objected to this analysis, which mangled Congress’s statutory
intent. Justice Thomas’s only comment on the bailout point was to take the
position that granting the utility district the chance to apply for bailout did not
grant it the relief it sought in its complaint.135
B.

Citizens United136

In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(“BCRA,” more commonly referred to as “McCain-Feingold”).137 This was the
most significant federal campaign finance law since the 1974 amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), whose constitutionality the Supreme
Sept 1, 2009). In other words, the government argued that Sheffield itself read the term “State” to
include political units within it; it did not argue that the utility district is a state.
131
Rick Hasen, The Scalia Enigma in NAMUDNO, Election Law Blog, Jun. 23, 2009, online at
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013921.html (visited Sept 1, 2009).
132
See Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30 (1986) (recounting in detail Congress’s amendment of
section 2 of the VRA to account for the Supreme Court’s City of Mobile holding).
133
See note 32 above (discussing Georgia v Ashcroft “fix”).
134
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Mukasey, 573 F Supp 2d at 232-33
(citing House and Senate reports).
135
NAMUDNO, 129 S Ct at 2517-18 (Thomas concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136
The next few paragraphs are drawn from Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts
Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v Wisconsin Right to Life, 94 Minn L Rev 1064 (2008).
137
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 101, 2 USC § 441i(a) (Supp. V 2007).
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Court considered in Buckley v Valeo.138 Although BCRA made many changes in
the law, the changes most relevant for purposes of understanding this case
concern BCRA’s “electioneering communications” provisions.
FECA (continuing a law predating FECA) bars corporations and unions
from spending general treasury funds on certain election-related activities.139
FECA allowed corporations and unions instead to set up separate political
committees (commonly referred to as PACs) to spend money on these campaigns,
but it limited both the amount that could be contributed and who could be
solicited to contribute to these PACs.
By the 1990s, many people viewed the FECA as ineffective, thanks to an
interpretation of the statute by the Court in Buckley.140 The Buckley Court held
that, to avoid vagueness and overbreadth problems within FECA, its provisions
should be interpreted to reach only election-related activity containing “express
advocacy,” such as “Vote for Smith.”141 Individuals, corporations, and unions
began running “issue ads” that appeared aimed at influencing federal elections but
that escaped FECA regulation through an avoidance of words of express
advocacy. Thus, individuals and entities that spent money on “Vote against
Jones” ads had to disclose the sources of payment and those ads could not be paid
for with corporate or union treasury funds. In contrast, there were no such
limitations on ads that appeared intended to influence federal elections but that
avoided the magic words of “express advocacy,” such as an ad which said “Call
Senator Jones and tell her what you think of her lousy vote on the stimulus bill.”
Spending on such ads increased dramatically in the 1990s.142
BCRA sought to close this issue advocacy “loophole” by creating new
“electioneering communications” provisions. Electioneering communications are
television or radio (not print or Internet) advertisements that feature a candidate
for federal election and are capable of reaching 50,000 people in the relevant
electorate 30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election. Anyone
making electioneering communications over a certain dollar threshold must
disclose contributions funding the ads and spending related to the ads to the FEC
(BCRA § 201).143 Corporations and unions cannot spend general treasury funds
on such ads (but could pay for the ads through their PACs) (BCRA § 203).144 In
addition, anyone broadcasting an electioneering communication must state in the
138

424 US 1 (1976).
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140
See McConnell v FEC, 540 US 93, 126 (2003).
141
Buckley, 424 US at 44 n.51.
142
See McConnell v FEC, 540 US at 126-27.
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See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 201, 2 USC § 434(f)(1) (Supp. V 2007).
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See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C § 441b(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. V
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ad the person or committee funding the ad and whether it is authorized by any
candidate (BCRA § 311).145
The § 203 spending limit does not apply to nonprofit corporations that
meet certain requirements, including that the nonprofit has a policy not to take
for-profit corporate or union funding.146 These groups are referred to as MCFL
groups (named after a 1986 Supreme Court case, FEC v Massachusetts Citizens
for Life147), and they still must comply with the disclosure provisions in BCRA §
201 and § 311.
A broad coalition of plaintiffs challenged each of these BCRA provisions
(along with a number of others) in McConnell v FEC.148 By a 5-4 vote, the
Supreme Court upheld BCRA § 203 against facial challenge. It reaffirmed the
Court’s controversial holding in Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce.149
Austin held that corporate spending on elections could be limited because of what
the Court termed the “distorting and corrosive effects” of immense aggregations
of wealth accomplished with the corporate form, which could be spent on
elections despite the corporation’s ideas having little or no public support.150
Relying on Austin’s upholding of corporate limits on “express advocacy,” the
McConnell Court held that the “issue ads” regulated by the electioneering
communications provisions of BCRA could constitutionally be limited because
most of them were the “functional equivalent of express advocacy.”151
In Wisconsin Right to Life v Federal Election Commission (WRTL I),152
the Court held that McConnell did not preclude an “as applied” challenge to
BCRA § 203 for a corporation or union whose ads were not the “functional
equivalent of express advocacy.” WRTL I involved a corporate-funded broadcast
advertising that mentioned Senator Feingold’s and Senator Kohl’s position on
judicial filibusters, and was to be broadcast in Wisconsin during the period of
Senator Feingold’s reelection campaign. After remand, in which the lower court
found the ads were not entitled to an exemption because they were the functional
equivalent of express advocacy, the case returned to the Supreme Court.153
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See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 311.
McConnell, 540 US at 210-11.
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479 US 238 (1986).
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540 US 93 (2003).
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494 US 652 (1990).
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Id at 660.
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McConnell, 540 US at 206. By an 8-1 vote, the Court also upheld BCRA § 201 and § 311
against facial challenge.
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546 US 410 (2006).
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In Wisconsin Right to Life v Federal Election Commission, (WRTL II),154
the Court held, on a 5-4 vote, that BCRA § 203 could not be constitutionally
applied to such ads. Three Justices in the majority (Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas) held, consistent with their dissenting opinions in McConnell, that BCRA
§ 203 was unconstitutional as applied to any corporate advertising, stating that
McConnell and Austin should be overruled.155 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, in a narrower controlling opinion, did not reach the question whether
McConnell and Austin should be overruled. They held instead that the only
corporate-funded advertisements that BCRA could bar constitutionally were those
that were the “functional equivalent of express advocacy.”156
The controlling opinion held that in making the “functional equivalent”
determination, the question the FEC or a court must consider is whether, without
regard to context (such as the fact that the filibuster issue was one that
conservatives were using to attack liberal Democrats) and without detailed
discovery of the intentions of the advertisers, the advertisement was susceptible of
no reasonable interpretation other than as an advertisement supporting or
opposing a candidate for office.157 Unless the ad was susceptible to “no
reasonable interpretation” other than as an advertisement supporting or opposing
the candidate, it would be unconstitutional to apply BCRA § 203 to bar corporate
funding for it. The controlling opinion then held that the ad at issue in WRTL II
was susceptible to an interpretation as something other than an ad against Senator
Feingold: it did not mention Senator Feingold’s character or fitness for office, and
had no other clear indicia of the functional equivalent of express advocacy.
Accordingly, WRTL was entitled to an as-applied exemption and could pay for
the ads with corporate funds.158
Citizens United is a follow-on case to WRTL II.159 Citizens United, a
nonprofit ideological corporation (but one that took some for-profit corporate
funding) produced a feature-length documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie.
The documentary appeared in theaters and was available to order via DVD during
the 2008 primary season. Citizens United wished to distribute the movie as well
through a cable television “video-on-demand” service. In exchange for a $1.2
million fee, a cable television operator consortium would have made the
documentary available to be downloaded by cable subscribers for free “on
demand” as part of an “Election 08” series. The documentary contained no
express advocacy, but it did contain a great deal of negative statements about
154
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Hillary Clinton, including statements that she was a “European socialist” and not
fit to be Commander-in-Chief. The FEC took the position that the documentary
was the functional equivalent of express advocacy and therefore subject to BCRA
§ 203, meaning it was an electioneering communication that could not be paid for
with corporate funds.160
Pursuant to a special jurisdictional provision of BCRA,161 Citizens United
filed suit against the FEC before a three-judge United States District Court for the
District of Columbia (with direct appeal to the Supreme Court). Citizens United
moved for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of BCRA § 203 for its
broadcast of the documentary through “video-on-demand.”162
The three-judge court unanimously rejected Citizens United’s
arguments.163 The court held that under WRTL II the documentary was the
functional equivalent of express advocacy and was therefore not entitled to an asapplied exemption: the movie could not be paid for with for-profit corporate
funds.164 Citizens United appealed from the denial of the preliminary injunction
to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal.165 The case returned to the
district court, which then granted summary judgment, relying on its earlier
opinion on the preliminary injunction.166
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for
argument.167 On appeal, Citizens United raised a number of arguments against
the government’s position that this documentary could not be broadcast over
cable television’s “video-on-demand” service because it constituted a corporatefunded “electioneering communication.” Some of the arguments were statutory;

160

Citizens United also wished to broadcast some 10-second and 30-second advertisements
promoting the documentary. The corporation wished to do so without complying with BCRA §
201 (requiring disclosure of funders) or § 311 (requiring the “disclaimer” stating who paid for the
advertisement and that it was not approved by any candidate or committee). The FEC conceded
that the advertisements (as opposed to the documentary itself) were not the “functional equivalent
of express advocacy,” but it took the position that the rules of BCRA § 201 and § 203 still
applied. According to the FEC, the disclosure rules were not eligible for the “as applied”
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2d 274.
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others were constitutional.168 Its narrowest argument is that that the FEC
regulations should not be construed to apply to “video-on-demand” cable
broadcasts.169 Simply put, the Court can hold that video-on-demand, which
requires a cable subscriber to choose to download video for viewing, is not a
“broadcast, cable or satellite communication that refers to a candidate for federal
office”170 as defined by BCRA.
Citizens United concedes that it did not make this argument below, but it
notes that the district court passed on it and that the canon of constitutional
avoidance gives the Court a reason to address this statutory question.171 Citizens
United’s broadest argument in its merits brief is that Austin was wrongly decided
and should be overruled; then even express advocacy by corporations in federal
elections could be paid for with corporate treasury funds.172 But as to the Austin
argument, the FEC notes that Citizens United did not raise this point below,
either, and that Citizens United expressly abandoned any facial challenges in the
district court.173 The issue also was not raised in Citizen United’s jurisdictional
168

Among the arguments raised is that the Court should expand the MCFL exemption for
nonprofit corporations that take some for-profit funds, and that its documentary was not the
functional equivalent of express advocacy.
169
Citizens United v FEC, Brief for Appellants at 27 n.2, online at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-205_Appellant.pdf (visited Sept 1,
2009).
170
2 USC § 434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. V 2007).
171
Id. The government disagrees that the Court should reach the question, Brief for Appellee at
24 n. 7, online at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-205_Appellee.pdf
(visited Sept 1, 2009), but the BCRA legislative sponsors (Sens. McCain and Feingold, and
former Representatives Shays and Meehan) filed an amicus brief suggesting that if the Court is
otherwise inclined to find for Citizens United in this case, it should do it on grounds that the
FEC’s implementing regulations did not clearly apply to “video-on-demand” broadcasts. Brief
Amici Curiae of Senators McCain and Feingold, and Former Representatives Shays and Meehan,
online
at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08205_AppelleAmCuMcCain.pdf, at 18-19 (visited Sept 1, 2009) (“To the extent that there may be
some ambiguity in the applicability of the regulations, the Court could possibly conclude that it is
sufficiently doubtful that on-demand viewing of Hillary: The Movie would have been within the
scope of the FEC’s current regulations that the Court should withhold judgment on the
constitutional issue until such time as the FEC made a more specific regulatory determination to
include such transmissions within the regulatory definition of electioneering communications. In
no event, however, should the Court accept Citizens United’s broad constitutional arguments that
would place even express advocacy beyond the bounds of regulation if it is accessed at the choice
of the viewer.”).
172
Citizens United v FEC, Brief for Appellants, at 30 (cited in note 169) (“Austin was wrongly
decided and should be overruled”).
173
Citizens United v FEC, Tr. oral arg., Mar. 24, 2009, at 27-28, online at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205.pdf (visited Sept 1,
2009).
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statement, and the usual Court rule is that the Court will not consider issues not
fairly raised therein.174
The case was argued in March 2009, and media accounts suggest that the
government’s case seemed threatened when the Deputy Solicitor General had
trouble answering a hypothetical question about the regulation of books
containing “the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”175 Still, it was
somewhat of a surprise when, on the last regular day of the Court’s term in June
2009, the Court announced it would rehear the case in September. More
surprising, the Court asked for supplemental briefing on the following question:
“For the proper disposition of this case, should the Court overrule either or both
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the part of
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which addresses the
facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2
U.S.C. §441b?”176 If the Court were going to decide the case on narrow statutory
grounds, such as a ruling that video-on-demand is not properly classified as an
electioneering communication, reargument on the constitutional question would
be unnecessary.177 The order indicates a Court that is at least seriously
considering the question.
C.
NAMUDNO, Citizen United, and the Supreme Court’s Usual Approach to
Constitutional Avoidance
Neither NAMUDNO nor Citizens United fits comfortably in the Supreme
Court’s usual approach to the constitutional avoidance doctrine. NAMUDNO
does not fit because the Court adopted an implausible interpretation of the statute.
Indeed, the Court’s statutory interpretation analysis was so weak that the Court
failed even to respond to the contrary statutory points raised by the government
and offered in detail by the district court. It is probably no surprise that in stating
the avoidance principle in NAMUDNO, the Court did not cite the usual
formulation of the rule requiring a plausible statutory interpretation. Instead, the
Court stated more flatly that “[o]ur usual practice is to avoid the unnecessary
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resolution of constitutional questions.”178 The Court then stated that “judging the
Constitutionality of an Act of Congress is the ‘gravest and most delicate duty that
this Court is called upon to perform.’”179 Finally, the Court cited Escambia
County for the proposition that the Court will not decide a constitutional question
if there is some other ground to dispose of the case.180 In practice, the Court
jettisoned the requirement of a plausible statutory interpretation in NAMUDNO to
avoid a sensitive and difficult constitutional question.
But the Court’s approach was even starker when viewed against the
Citizens United order the Court issued just one week later. The Court
undoubtedly could avoid deciding whether to overrule Austin and McConnell’s
upholding of spending limits on corporations and unions through a plausible
interpretation of the electioneering communication statute so as not to apply to
video-on-demand. But regardless of how it ultimately decides the case, it
ratcheted up the importance of the case and the rhetoric through the reargument
order.
Thus, the operative question here is not simply how plausible a statutory
construction must be before the avoidance canon kicks in,181 but why the Court
adopted such an inconsistent approach. If it is true that the “usual practice” is to
“avoid the unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions” and that it is the
“gravest and most delicate duty” to review the constitutionality of an Act of
Congress, why did the Court in Citizens United not conclude, as in NAMUDNO,
Ricci, and Escambia County, that the Court will not decide the constitutional
question because there is some other ground to dispose of the case? Is not
avoidance especially warranted in a case in which the constitutional issue was
abandoned in the trial court and not presented in the jurisdictional statement?
Why did the Court not follow its usual practice in Clark v Martinez, to the effect
that “[i]f [one of two plausible statutory constructions] would raise a multitude of
constitutional problems, the other should prevail…”?182 Why did the Court
instead set up an in-your-face high stakes constitutional showdown on the
question—whether or not it ultimately issues a constitutional ruling on the merits?

III.
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UNDERSTANDING AVOIDANCE AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE
AT THE ROBERTS COURT
The contrast between the Court’s treatment of NAMUDNO and Citizens
United is the latest (and especially high profile) illustration of Judge Friendly’s
observation that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance will be selectively
employed.183 In the final part of this article, I explore three potential theories to
explain the differing treatment of the two cases. With a data set of just these
cases (plus the few other significant constitutional avoidance decisions of the
Roberts Court), and with no inside information about the Justices’ thought
processes, at this point it is impossible to say which of the three theories best
explains the action of the Court in these two cases. But I set out these potential
theories to test against future use of the avoidance canon and the anti-avoidance
canon by the Roberts Court.
Fruitful dialogue. The fruitful dialogue explanation posits that the Court
will use constitutional avoidance only when doing so would further a dialogue
with Congress that has a realistic chance of actually avoiding constitutional
problems through redrafting. On this reading, the Voting Rights Act got
remanded to Congress because Congress may fix the VRA in ways that do not
violate the Constitution, but the corporate spending limits provision of federal
campaign finance law perhaps does not deserve remand because the provisions
are not constitutionally fixable.
This is the most charitable reading of the Court’s contrasting orders in
NAMUDNO and Citizens United. In this view, the Court would not tolerate the
political avoidance that Congress exhibited during the 2006 Amendment
process,184 but the Voting Rights Act is just too important to throw away without
giving Congress a chance to face the problems head on. In other words, the
statute is so important that the Court was willing to jettison its usual rules of
statutory interpretation despite the strong negative views of some members of the
Court on the underlying constitutional question to give Congress one more chance
to save the statute. This at least may have been the view of Justice Kennedy, and
without his vote the Court would have spoken in a fractured way in this important
case.
Campaign finance, in contrast, stands on different footing. The Court is
already well on its way to striking down corporate spending limits as a violation
of the First Amendment.185 Giving Congress a chance to fix BCRA section 203
183
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to clarify whether or not video-on-demand counts as an electioneering
communication is not going to solve the Court’s fundamental problem with the
Austin rationale for limiting corporate spending. If Congress cannot limit
corporate spending even on express advocacy, then it matters little whether
Congress intended to cover the “functional equivalent of express advocacy”
contained in a video-on-demand documentary.
Understood this way, the Court’s decision to make the issue front-andcenter at a second oral argument makes sense. This anti-avoidance device—
pushing the constitutional question front-and-center—can serve the penumbral
“fence around the Torah” function of keeping Congress away from even thinking
of legislating further in a protected area.
Furthermore, some members of the Court may have thought the
constitutional issue needed to be addressed given that Citizens United came to the
Court under its rare mandatory appellate jurisdiction.186 The Court had been
facing a flurry of mandatory appeals under BCRA, and perhaps it saw that the
only way to lessen the volume of cases was through a constitutional knock-down
of BCRA’s foundations.
Indeed, even Justices unsure of their constitutional views going into
Citizens United might have seen a judicial administration benefit to deciding the
constitutional questions straightforwardly. Addressing constitutional questions
squarely in the campaign finance area might be especially important given the
incoherence and fractured nature of the Supreme Court’s existing campaign
Lower courts would certainly benefit from more
finance jurisprudence.187
guidance.
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As I detail in Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from
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Such use of the anti-avoidance tool is not unprecedented. Perhaps the
Court’s refusal to apply the avoidance canon to save the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 in Boumendine188 was a way for the Court to warn Congress off further
attempts to deny basic trial rights to Guantanamo detainees. Conservative Justices
skeptical of the Court’s abortion rights jurisprudence see anti-avoidance there too:
construing ambiguous abortion statutes to raise constitutional problems chills new
abortion-related legislation. Justice Kennedy made the point in Gonzales v
Carhart,189 but he was not the first. The idea seems to have originated with
Justice White’s dissent in Thornburgh v American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists.190 There, Justice White argued that “[t]he Court’s rejection of a
perfectly plausible reading of [an abortion] statute flies in the face of the
principle—which until today I had thought applicable to abortion statutes as well
as to other legislative enactments—that ‘[w]here fairly possible, courts should
construe a statute to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality.’ The Court’s reading
is obviously based on an entirely different principle: that in cases involving
abortion, a permissible reading of a statute is to be avoided at all costs.”191
Though the fruitful dialogue theory sounds plausible, it is not clear that it
explains the actual thinking of the Justices. The explanation views the Court as
bending over backwards in NAMUDNO to spur Congressional dialogue on the
constitutionality of race-based remedies in voting, dialogue which the Congress
showed in 2006 it had no interest in undertaking. From oral argument, it did not
sound like members of the Court had much interest in dialogue either. Justice
Scalia pointedly noted that the 2006 renewal passed 98-0 in the Senate, and on a
similarly lopsided vote in the House, asking: “You know, the -- the Israeli
Supreme Court, the Sanhedrin, used to have a rule that if the death penalty was
pronounced unanimously, it was invalid, because there must be something wrong
there. Do you ever expect -- do you ever seriously expect Congress to vote
against a reextension of the Voting Rights Act? Do you really think that any
incumbent would -- would vote to do that?”192
It seems more accurate to say that the liberals, led by Justice Souter, were
looking for some way to avoid an adverse ruling striking down section 5 as
unconstitutional, and that the conservatives were ready to strike down Section 5.
188
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Why everyone but Justice Thomas agreed to go along with a very weak avoidance
interpretation seems driven less by a desire for dialogue with Congress than from
fear193 or strategic calculation. It is to these alternatives that I now turn.
Political legitimacy. The political legitimacy explanation posits that the
Court uses the constitutional avoidance doctrine when it fears that full-blown
constitutional pronouncement would harm its legitimacy.194 Some evidence
supports this understanding of NAMUDNO and the reargument order in Citizens
United. During the same term that the Court avoided the constitutional issue in
NAMUDNO, it used the same avoidance canon to narrowly construe a different
provision of the Voting Rights Act in Bartlett v Strickland,195 and it applied
constitutional avoidance (in deed if not in name) to narrowly construe Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Ricci v DeStefano,196 the controversial New Haven
firefighters case. Each of these cases involved tough questions of race relations
whose resolution could harm the Court’s legitimacy.197 A Court fearful of
193

As Heather Gerken observed: “The real worry for supporters of Section 5 is the possibility that
the Court’s liberals thought that sending a crystal clear, united message to Congress was Section
5's best hope. That is, the four Justices on the Court may have been as convinced as many
commentators are that Section 5 will fall when the case returns, and they were hoping that a
unanimous opinion would light a fire under Congress.” Gerken: Can Congress Take a Hint?,
Election Law Blog, Jun. 23, 2009, online at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013911.html
(visited Sept. 1, 2009). On the message the Court conservatives might have been sending to
Congress, see Ellen Katz, Ellen Katz: Roberts Didn’t Blink, Election Law Blog, June 24, 2009,
online at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013926.html (visited Sept 1, 2009) and Richard H.
Pildes, A Warning to Congress, N.Y. Times Room for Debate Blog, June 22, 2009, online at
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/the-battle-not-the-war-on-votingrights/?scp=1&sq=Pildes&st=cse#richard (visited Sept 1, 2009)..
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June 29, 2009, online at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-has-roberts-court-goneminimalist.html (visited Sept 1, 2009); Guest Post: Behind the Scenes in NAMUDNO, Election
Law Blog, June 24, 2009, online at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013932.html (visited Sept
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Dahlia Lithwick, Our Judges with Attitude, Slate, June 26, 2009, online at
http://www.slate.com/id/2220927/entry/2221700/ (visited Sept. 1, 2009).
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Congressional or public reaction, especially with the other two branches
dominated by the more liberal Democrats, just might have blinked.198
In contrast, campaign finance issues are much lower salience to the
199
public, and are less likely to arouse the passion of interest groups and perhaps
the ire of Congress. A court concerned about political legitimacy might think it
has a great deal more latitude in how it deals with questions of money in politics
than with fundamental questions of race relations. Under this reading, the Court
can afford anti-avoidance when it comes to lower salience questions such as
campaign finance, but it needs avoidance to quell the racial waters.
While that explanation seems to make sense viewing these two cases
alone, it is harder to square with the use of anti-avoidance in the abortion context,
which is much higher salience. Perhaps another factor is at work: how convinced
the Court is that the government action is unconstitutional. This would tie
together elements of legitimacy and fixability.
Political calculus. The political calculus explanation is that the Court
uses constitutional avoidance and similar doctrines (such as the use of “as
applied” constitutional challenges200) to soften public and Congressional
resistance to the Court’s efforts to move the law in the Justices’ preferred policy
direction.201 Like the political legitimacy argument, the political calculus
argument too is one about the Court’s legitimacy, but it is one that views the
Court as strategically pursuing an agenda, rather than as fearfully anticipating a
backlash. It advances a view of the Court, and of the Chief Justice in particular,
as sophisticated and calculating. A recent portrayal of Chief Justice Roberts in a
critical New Yorker article by Jeffrey Toobin referred to the Chief as a “stealth
hard liner.”202 The view also has echoes in Justice Scalia’s lament in the WRTL
198
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online
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II case that the Roberts-Alito “as applied” decision on BCRA section 203 was
“faux judicial restraint.”203
Under this positive political theory explanation204 of the Court’s actions,
the difference between NAMUDNO and Citizens United is simply one of timing.
The Court had already laid the groundwork for a deregulatory campaign finance
regime through its earlier campaign finance rulings which exhibited some of that
faux judicial restraint: it is now ready to put a stake in the heart of the corporate
spending limits, if not in Citizens United, than in another challenge soon to come.
If that reading is correct, the Voting Rights Act’s time of demise will come, and
the public will come to expect it once the Court first raised constitutional doubts
in NAMUDNO. The avoidance canon is just another doctrinal tool in the Court’s
arsenal to move constitutional law and policy in the Court’s direction and at the
Court’s chosen speed.
Tom Goldstein seems to take this view of the Court, seeing the
conservative majority using the avoidance doctrine and similar doctrines as laying
the groundwork for subsequent overruling.
I am struck in particular by the opinions of the Chief Justice that
seem to lay down markers that will be followed in later generations
of cases. NAMUDNO details constitutional objections to Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act that seem ready-made for a later decision
invalidating the statute if it is not amended….
If I’m right about the direction of the case law, the Court’s
methodology is striking. It is reinforcing its own legitimacy with
opinions that later can be cited to demonstrate that it is not rapidly
or radically changing the law. This approach may be in the
starkest relief if next Term the Court cites its recent decision in
Wisconsin Right to Life as precedent for concluding that
McConnell v. FEC and Austin v. Michigan have been significantly
undermined and should be overruled. The plurality and
concurrence in Wisconsin Right to Life famously debated how
aggressively the Court should go in overruling prior campaign
203

WRTL II, 127 S Ct at 2683-84 n.7 (Scalia concurring).
Positive political theory views political actors seeking to maximize their preferences within
institutional constraints. For an introduction to the concept as applied to statutory interpretation
and interactions between the Supreme Court and Congress (and within each institution), see
Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at 75-76 (cited in note 12).
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finance precedent. The Chief Justice urged patience – not moving
more quickly than required – and the wait may not have been
long.205
The political calculus explanation meshes particularly well with the
peculiar nature of the NAMUDNO statutory decision. Ordinarily when Congress
considers overriding a statutory interpretation decision of the Supreme Court,
doing so will restore a popular law enacted by Congress (leaving open the
possibility that the Court will later strike the law down on constitutional
grounds).206 Here, the situation is different: Congress is not going to consider
overriding the Court’s interpretation of the bailout provision in the Voting Rights
Act; there is not much to gain by doing so (we do not know how many
jurisdictions will now seek bailout that could not before) and an override could
goad the Court into striking down section 5. Either Congress will do nothing—in
which case the Court has laid the groundwork for invalidating section 5 in a
future case—or the Congress will pass legislation watering down section 5’s key
provisions to please the conservatives on the Court. It is a win-win situation for a
Court making strategic calculations to move the law towards its policy
preferences.
***
As I noted, we do not have enough data from the cases to know which of
these three explanations for alternating avoidance and anti-avoidance best
represent reality. Likely one’s views on which explanation coheres best
correlates with one’s views on the general motivations and sincerity of the
Justices on the Supreme Court. But it is simply too early to tell, and always
hazardous to generalize about the actions of a multi-member body.207 Some
members of the Court may be concerned about its legitimacy; others may wish to
engage in a dialogue; others may be acting more strategically. Perhaps the
simplest explanation of the divergence in the cases is Justice Kennedy’s different
position in the two cases.
One test of the theories may come if Congress does nothing to amend the
VRA or it amends the Voting Rights Act but not in any way that meaningfully
205
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addresses the Court’s concerns in NAMUDNO. A Court that does not act then to
strike down the Act looks more like one motivated by fear;208 a Court that strikes
down section 5, citing the earlier warnings in NAMUDNO, may fit more into the
political calculus explanation. Then again, at that point a Court that seeks to
encourage fruitful dialogue with Congress might simply give up on the Congress
in this particular area.

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court can choose at will to use the avoidance canon or antiavoidance for myriad purposes.209 Looking at the Warren Court, Phil Frickey
viewed the canon as being used to further civil liberties in a time of irrational fear
of communists.210 He suggested avoidance could come in handy for the Roberts
Court too as a way of furthering civil liberties, by cutting back on Congress’s
overreaching in the terrorist cases.211 Writing at the beginning of the Roberts
Court’s term, Neal Devins disagreed with Frickey on this point, stating a belief
that the Roberts Court would not likely rely much on the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance.212 First, Devins said, Congress is less engaged in
constitutional matters and less interested in dialogue than during the Warren
Court era. Second, Congress does not seem poised to strike back at the Court.
And third, Congress did not significantly respond during the Rehnquist Court era
when the Court struck down all or part of 31 statutes on federalist grounds, so
there is no reason for the Court to fear Congress.213
Devins may have been wrong about the Court’s interest in dialogue with
Congress, at least as to those statutes, like the VRA, which might be
constitutionally saved. The Court may be embarking on a new era of dialogue
with Congress, at least for “fixable” statutes.
Then again, even if the Roberts Court has no interest in dialogue, or in
protecting civil liberties at a time of national peril, the Court still may find good
reason for selective use of avoidance and anti-avoidance. The rare use of anti208
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avoidance lays down constitutional markers and builds a fence around the
majority’s view of proper constitutional boundaries. The avoidance canon gives
the public appearance of a Court moving moderately and slowly. Notably, the
headlines after NAMUDNO were about the Court “upholding” and “preserving”
though “narrowing” the VRA,214 not about it taking the next step towards striking
the VRA down. If the agenda of the Roberts Court is major change in
constitutional law, the calculation may be that medicine usually goes down more
palatably when in small doses.
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See the headlines collected by Howard Bashman at his “How Appealing” blog on June 23,
2009, online at http://howappealing.law.com/062309.html#034476 (visited Sept 1, 2009).
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